Uncountable superperfect forcing is tree forcing on regular uncountable cardinals κ with κ <κ = κ, using trees in which the heights of nodes that split along any branch in the tree form a club set, and such that any node in the tree with more than one immediate extension has measure-one-many extensions, where the measure is relative to some κ-complete, nonprincipal normal filter (or p-filter) F. This forcing adds a generic of minimal degree if and only if F is κ-saturated. Among other things, she showed that in certain cases this forcing adds a generic sequence of minimal degree over the ground model. We will extend that result and prove a partial converse.
In [1] , Elizabeth Theta Brown defined a generalization of Miller forcing [5] to uncountable cardinals κ. Among other things, she showed that in certain cases this forcing adds a generic sequence of minimal degree over the ground model. We will extend that result and prove a partial converse.
Miller forcing conditions are ω-trees, subtrees of <ω ω, with the property that every node has either a single immediate successor or infinitely many immediate successors. In the second case, we say the node splits in the tree, or is a splitting node; a further requirement for a tree to be a condition is that every node in the tree has an extension that splits in the tree.
In Brown's generalization of this forcing, conditions are κ-trees, and a splitting node must have not just infinitely many successors, but measure-one many as determined by some filter F on κ. More precisely, assume that κ is a regular uncountable cardinal such that κ <κ = κ and F is a κ-complete nonprincipal filter on κ. We require that if p is a condition in P and s splits in p, then {α ∈ κ | s α ∈ p} ∈ F, where s α denotes the concatenation of s with α . There are further requirements, which we will specify later, on the density of splitting nodes in p. Brown shows that if F is a normal ultrafilter on κ, then P adds a minimal degree over the ground model [1] .
In Theorem 7, we show that if F is not κ-saturated (that is, if it is possible to partition κ into κ-many disjoint sets of F-positive measure), then P does not add a minimal degree over the ground model. If κ carries a κ-saturated, κ-complete nonprincipal filter, then κ must be measurable in an inner model [4] , so in most cases P will not add a minimal degree.
The proof of this theorem proceeds by showing that P adds a Cohen generic subset of κ. In Theorem 10 we show that this is the only way P can fail to add a minimal degree; specifically, we show that any set in the generic extension that is not of the same degree as the generic can actually be added by Cohen forcing over κ.
In the opposite direction, in Theorem 14, we extend Brown's result for normal ultrafilters to show that if F is normal (or even a p-filter), and F is κ-saturated, then P does add a minimal degree over the ground model. Thus, in the case that F is normal (or a p-filter), κ-saturation is a necessary and sufficient condition for the P-generic to be of minimal degree.
We have described P as a generalization of Miller forcing. However, Miller forcing can easily be shown to add a generic of minimal degree, and in most cases P does not do so. A major difference between the two forcing notions, which plays out here, is the nature of the splitting sets. In Miller forcing, splitting sets (the immediate successors of a splitting node) are required only to be infinite, that is, to have positive measure according to the cofinite filter; in P, splitting sets must have measure one according to the filter F. The key distinction is between positive measure and measure one. If F is an ultrafilter, of course, measure one and positive measure coincide; and it is only when F is very close to being an ultrafilter (when F is κ-saturated) that P can add a generic of minimal degree.
To make a closer analogy, we should consider variants of Miller forcing in which splitting sets are required to be measure one according to some filter on ω. Groszek has investigated the question of when such forcings add generics of minimal degree; some results in this paper are generalizations to κ of results in [3] .
There is a second difference between Miller forcing and P. Along any cofinal branch through a condition in P, the (lengths of) splitting nodes are club; in particular, they are measure one according to the club filter. Along any cofinal branch through a Miller condition, the splitting nodes are infinite, that is, positive measure according to the cofinite filter. This would lead us to expect P to be more similar in some ways to Laver forcing on ω, as along a cofinal branch through a Laver condition the splitting nodes are in fact cofinite.
As regards the question of minimality, P is closer to (the variants of) Miller forcing on ω than to Laver forcing; the similarity to Laver forcing becomes apparent when we consider questions of bounding. Laver forcing adds a generic real that dominates every ground model real on a cofinite set, while a Miller generic merely dominates ground model reals on an infinite set. The P-generic dominates every ground model κ-sequence on a club set. The connection here is closer than the analogy between cofinite and club as both being measure one sets; Cummings and Shelah have shown that if κ is large enough, the bounding and dominating numbers on κ are the same as the club bounding and dominating numbers [2] .
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we assume that κ is an uncountable regular cardinal and κ <κ = κ. We let F denote a filter on κ that is nonprincipal (for α ∈ κ, we have κ − {α} ∈ F) and κ-complete (closed under intersections of size less than κ: if {X γ | γ < α} is a subset of F of size α < κ, then {X γ | γ < α} ∈ F). The property of κ-completeness is necessary to ensure that the forcing P is κ-closed and therefore preserves κ as a regular cardinal. We sometimes refer to sets in F as measure one sets, sets in the dual ideal as measure zero sets, and sets not in the dual ideal as positive measure sets.
The filter F is normal if it is closed under diagonal intersections of κ-sequences: if X γ | γ < κ is a sequence from F, then the diagonal intersection
is in F. A weaker property than normality is being a p-filter: The filter F is a p-filter if whenever X γ | γ < κ is a sequence from F, there is a set X ∈ F with the property that X is almost contained in every X γ :
Of course, F is an ultrafilter if κ cannot be partitioned into two disjoint sets of F-positive measure. The filter F is κ-saturated if κ cannot be partitioned into κ-many disjoint sets of F-positive measure. (This is equivalent to the usual definition of κ-saturation under our assumptions on F and κ.)
We use the filter F to define a forcing partial order P. This forcing was defined by Brown in [1] . In the rest of this section we restate some key definitions and properties of the forcing, mostly without proof. Definition 1. A condition in P is a tree p ⊆ <κ κ satisfying the following properties:
1. The tree p is downward closed (which is basically what we mean by tree): if s ∈ p and r is an initial segment of s, then r ∈ p. 2. Every element (node) of p, viewed as a sequence from κ, is strictly increasing. 3. The tree p is closed under limits of sequences of length less than κ: If s γ | γ < α , for α < κ, is an increasing sequence of nodes of p, then the limit {s γ | γ < α} is also in p. 4. For s ∈ p, we let E p s = {α | s α ∈ p}, where s α denotes the concatenation of s with α . Then for all s ∈ p, E p s is either a singleton or an element of F. In the second case, we say that s splits in p, or is a splitting node. 5. Every s ∈ p has an extension that splits in p. 6. If s γ | γ < α , for α < κ, is an increasing sequence of splitting nodes of p, then the limit {s γ | γ < α} also splits in p.
The partial ordering P is ordered by p ≤ q ⇐⇒ p ⊆ q.
That is, the conditions in P are trees, consisting of sequences from κ of length less than κ, satisfying certain closure and branching conditions. Stronger conditions are subtrees. A cofinal branch through a condition p, that is, a maximal linearly-ordered subset of p, can be identified with a function from κ to κ. If G ⊆ P is a generic set, we identify G with a "generic function" g : κ → κ, which is the unique cofinal branch common to all the trees in G.
Proposition 2. The partial ordering P is κ-closed: If p γ | γ < α is a decreasing sequence from P of length α < κ, then its limit p γ | γ < α is a condition in P.
A consequence of this proposition is that P preserves cardinals up to and including κ. If 2 κ = κ + , preservation of κ ++ and larger cardinals follows by standard counting arguments. Preservation of κ + relies on a fusion argument: Although P is not closed under limits of κ sequences, it is closed under limits of certain κ sequences called fusion sequences, and this is enough to show that κ + is preserved (which we will not show here). The fusion argument is also a critical tool in proving minimality of the generic. In the rest of this section we give the definitions and facts we will need for this purpose.
Definition 3.
If p is a condition in P, trunk( p) is the minimal node that splits in p.
If s ∈ p, p s is the maximal subtree of p whose trunk extends s;
The set of splitting nodes of p is split( p) = {s | s splits in p}.
The αth splitting level of p, split α ( p), is defined by
and for λ a limit ordinal,
Finally, we define
Note that p ≤ α q means that p is a subtree of q, p and q are the same up to the αth splitting level, and every node in split α (q) also splits in p. In particular, p ≤ 0 q means that p is a subtree of q with the same trunk.
Proposition 4 (Fusion Lemma). Let LOR be the class of limit ordinals. If p γ | γ < κ is a fusion sequence from P, that is, if it satisfies:
Proposition 5. If p ∈ P and {q(s) | s ∈ split α ( p)} is a collection of conditions such that
Furthermore, for s ∈ split α ( p), q s = q(s).
Proposition 6 incorporates into a single proposition the applications of the fusion method we will need.
Proposition 6. If ϕ is a property of conditions satisfying
Proof. Given p ∈ P, produce the desired q ≤ p by constructing a fusion sequence p γ | γ < κ . Let
and for α ∈ LOR,
Given p γ , for each s ∈ split γ ( p γ ), choose q(s) ≤ 0 ( p γ ) s with the property ϕ(q(s)). Then by Proposition 5, we can set
By construction, we have
Now apply Proposition 4 to set
For every γ < κ, since q ≤ γ p γ +1 , it follows that
so by the properties of ϕ,
and the condition q has the desired properties. Note: Not only is it the case that q ≤ γ p γ +1 , but actually q ≤ γ +1 p γ +1 ; it follows from this that for every s in split γ (q), E 
. This means that in considering subsets of M in the generic extension, we need only consider such terms, "terms for subsets of M". We will sometimes blur the distinction between elements of M[g] and terms.
Non-minimality
Theorem 7. Suppose that κ can be partitioned into κ-many disjoint F-positive measure sets. Then forcing with P adds a Cohen generic subset of κ.
In particular, this implies that the P-generic g is not of minimal degree over the ground model, as the even and odd parts of a Cohen generic are of incomparable degree over the ground model.
Proof. Let Q denote the forcing to add a Cohen generic subset of κ; conditions in Q are sequences s in <κ κ, ordered by end-extension. Note that Q is κ-closed and, by assumption on κ, has size κ.
By assumption, we can partition κ into κ-many disjoint sets of positive measure, which we can index by elements of <κ κ:
From the P-generic g, we define a new sequence f [g] as follows. Given γ < κ, we let
and for any function h : α → κ, α ≤ κ, we let f [h] be the concatenation of
Because of the regularity of κ, f [g] is a κ-length sequence, so f [g] has the correct form to be a Q-generic.
To show that P forces f [g] to be a Q-generic, it suffices to show that for every p ∈ P and every dense set D ⊆ Q, there is an extension r ≤ p such that
Note that if q is a condition in P and t ⊆ trunk(q), then
Let p and D be given. Let s be the trunk of p; then f [s] ∈ Q. Because D is dense in Q, there is a condition r ⊃ f [s] such that r ∈ D. We can write r = f [s] u for some u ∈ <κ κ. Now because X u is of positive measure and E p s is of measure one, there is some
as desired.
Theorem 10 shows that adding a Cohen subset of κ is essentially the only way in which P can fail to add a minimal degree. Specifically, we show that any set of intermediate degree between the ground model and the P-generic can be added by Cohen forcing.
Lemma 9 isolates a strategy that is used in showing that a set is not of intermediate degree. It will be useful in the next section as well as in the proof of Theorem 10.
Definition 8. If τ is a term for a subset of M, and p and q are conditions, we say that p ⊥ τ q if
That is, p ⊥ τ q if p and q force incompatible facts about τ . If this is the case, then by knowing τ [G], the realization of τ in M[G], we can distinguish which of the alternatives p ∈ G or q ∈ G can possibly be true.
Lemma 9. If τ is a term for a subset of the ground model M, and p ∈ P has the property:
Proof. In this case, whenever s splits in p, and r and t are two different immediate extensions of s in p, we have that p r and p t force incompatible facts about τ ; thus, if we know g is a generic branch through p and s ⊂ g, from τ we can identify the unique immediate extension of s contained in g. In this way we can use τ to trace the generic branch through p, determining which way g turns at every splitting node. More precisely, p forces that
or τ is added by a κ-closed forcing of size κ.
We will call a κ-closed forcing of size κ a κ-Cohen forcing. By "τ is added by a κ-Cohen forcing", we mean that there is a κ-Cohen forcing in M that is equivalent to a two-step iteration R 1 R 2 such that τ is equivalent to the R 1 -generic. In particular, by general forcing technology, if G C is a κ-Cohen generic, every subset of M in M[G C ] is added by a κ-Cohen forcing.
Proof. Suppose that τ is a term for a subset of M in M[g] that is not in M and not added by a κ-Cohen forcing. Beginning with a condition p, we find q ≤ p such that q forces g ∈ M[τ ].
We know, by general forcing technology, that τ is equivalent to a generic for some partial ordering Q, so we can safely assume τ denotes a Q-generic. We can also assume that the Q-generic is forced (by 1 Q ) not to be added by a κ-Cohen forcing. (This is because "G Q is added by a κ-Cohen forcing" can be evaluated in
Claim 1: If p is a condition with trunk s, then there is a condition r ≤ 0 p such that one of the following two conditions holds:
, where m.a.c. denotes "maximal antichain". Proof of Claim 1: Enumerate E p s = {η(α) | α < κ}. By induction on α produce conditions r α (β) ≤ p s η(β) for β ≥ α:
Set r 0 (β) = p s η(β) , and if α ∈ L O R has been reached, for β ≥ α set r α (β) = {r γ (β) | γ < α}. If, for α < κ, the condition r α = {r α (β) | β ≥ α} satisfies condition 2, then set r = r α ; this is the desired condition.
Otherwise, as condition 2 fails, we can choose a maximal antichain A ⊆ Q such that
Because τ is forced to be Q-generic, we can choose x(α) ∈ A and r s η(α) ≤ r α (α) so that
and, by choice of A, for β > α we can choose r α+1 (β) ≤ r α (β) so that
If we are in this ("otherwise") case for all α < κ, then r = {r s η(α) | α < κ} is the desired condition: For α < β we have
Claim 2: Any condition p can be extended to have the property that for every s ∈ split( p), p s has the property of r in Claim 1, i.e., for each p s either condition 1 or condition 2 holds. This follows from Proposition 6 and, in particular, the note at the end of its proof.
Claim 3: Given such p, suppose condition 2 holds densely:
is dense in p. We can view the tree p as a κ-closed partial ordering of size κ, with conditions being nodes of p and stronger conditions being extensions. By our supposition, forcing with p adds a Q-generic: If G p is a generic subset of p, then a Q-generic is generated by
This is a contradiction, since the Q-generic is forced not to be added by a κ-closed forcing of size κ. Claim 4: Therefore, we can choose t ∈ p such that
By Lemma 9, q = p t forces that g ∈ M[τ ].
The P-generic g, in contrast, cannot be added by κ-Cohen forcing. This is because κ-Cohen forcing has the κ + chain condition (every antichain has size at most κ) but below every p ∈ P there is an antichain of size 2 κ . This means that g, even if not of minimal degree over M, has a certain minimality property; g cannot be added by κ-Cohen forcing over M, while every set of smaller M-degree can.
Minimality
In the last section, we showed that if F is not κ-saturated, then P does not add a minimal degree. Throughout this section we will assume that F is κ-saturated, that is, κ cannot be partitioned into κ-many disjoint sets of F-positive measure. We will show that if F is normal, or even simply a p-filter, then P does add a minimal degree. This extends Brown's result in [1] for the case when F is a normal ultrafilter.
Lemma 11. Suppose that whenever τ is a term for a subset of M that is not an element of M, and p is a condition with trunk s, then there is a condition q ≤ 0 p such that ϕ(q):
Then P adds a minimal degree over the ground model M.
Proof. Let τ be any term for a subset of M that is not an element of M. By Proposition 6, the set of conditions p such that (∀s ∈ split( p)) [ϕ( p s )] is dense in P. But by Lemma 9, such a condition forces that g ∈ M[τ ]. Therefore, for any
Since r α ≤ q γ , we have r δ ⊥ τ r α . If σ ∈ E p s − X and σ = α, then σ is in every Y γ − X γ , and therefore we have r δ ⊥ τ p s σ , and so we can set r σ = p s σ to complete the proof.
Lemma 13. Suppose that F is a p-filter, τ is a term for a subset of M that is not in M, and p is a condition with trunk s. Then there is a condition q ≤ 0 p with the property:
Proof. We will use Lemma 12 to build a nested sequence of measure one sets X β with empty intersection, and conditions q δ ≤ p s δ , such that whenever δ ∈ X β and γ ∈ X β , then q δ and q γ force incompatible facts about τ . Then we will use the p-filter property of F to find a measure one set X that intersects each X β+1 − X β in a set Y β of size less than κ. If δ and γ are in different Y β , then q δ and q γ force incompatible facts about τ . Finally, we will use the small size of the Y β and the κ-closure of the forcing to further extend the q δ to q δ such that if δ and γ are in the same Y β , then q δ and q γ also force incompatible facts about τ . Then q = {q δ | δ ∈ X } has the right properties.
Define X 0 = E p s and, for δ ∈ X 0 , q 0 s δ = p s δ . If λ is a limit ordinal less than κ, define X λ = {X β | β < λ} and, for δ ∈ X λ , q λ s δ = {q β s δ | β < λ}. Given X β and q β s δ for δ ∈ X β , apply Lemma 12 to q β = {q β s δ | δ ∈ X β } and α β = min(X β ) to get a measure one set X β+1 ⊆ X β with α β ∈ X β+1 and conditions q β+1 s δ ≤ q β s δ for δ ∈ X β such that if δ ∈ X β+1 and γ ∈ X β − X β+1 ,
Since the X β form a continuous nested sequence with empty intersection (this last because min(X β ) ∈ X β+1 ), for each δ ∈ E p s there is a unique ordinal β such that δ ∈ X β − X β+1 . Since F is a p-filter, we can find a measure one set X ⊆ X 0 almost contained in each X β ; that is, Y β = X ∩ (X β − X β+1 ) partitions X into sets of size less than κ. Note that if β < α, δ ∈ Y β ⊆ X β − X β+1 , and γ ∈ Y α ⊆ X β+1 , we have It is easy to do this for a single pair of conditions: Since τ is forced not to be in M, there is some x such that q β+1 s δ does not decide "x ∈ τ "; so extend q β+1 s γ to decide "x ∈ τ ", and then extend q β+1 s δ to decide "x ∈ τ " in the opposite way. But since Y β has size less than κ and P is κ-closed, in less than κ-many successive extensions we can take care of all pairs in Y β .
Finally, set q = {q s δ | δ ∈ X }.
By construction, for all δ = γ in E q s = X , whether or not δ and γ are in the same Y β we have that q s δ and q s γ force incompatible facts about τ . Theorem 14. If F (a nonprincipal κ-complete filter over κ) is a p-filter and κ-saturated, then P adds a generic of minimal degree over the ground model.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemmas 13 and 11.
